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It is well known that people take advantage of prior knowledge to bias decisions.  To investigate 
this phenomenon behaviorally and in the brain, we acquired fMRI data while human subjects 
viewed ambiguous abstract shapes and decided whether a shape was of Category A (smoother) 
or B (bumpier).  The decision was made in the context of one of two prior knowledge cues, 80/20 
and 50/50. The 80/20 cue indicated that upcoming shapes had an 80% probability of being of 
one category, e.g., B, and a 20% probability of being of the other. The 50/50 cue indicated that 
upcoming shapes had an equal probability of being of either category.  The ideal observer would 
bias decisions in favor of the indicated alternative at 80/20 and show zero bias at 50/50. We 
found that subjects did bias their decisions in the predicted direction at 80/20 but did not show 
zero bias at 50/50. Instead, at 50/50 the subjects retained biases of the same sign as their 80/20 
biases, though of diminished magnitude. The signature of a persistent though diminished bias 
at 50/50 was also evident in fMRI data from frontal and parietal regions previously implicated 
in decision-making. As a control, we acquired fMRI data from naïve subjects who experienced 
only the 50/50 stimulus distributions during both the pre-scan training and the fMRI experiment. 
The behavioral and fMRI data from the naïve subjects reflected decision biases closer to those 
of the ideal observer than those of the prior knowledge subjects at 50/50. The results indicate 
that practice making decisions in the context of non-equal prior probabilities biases decisions 
made later when prior probabilities are equal. This finding may be related to the “anchoring 
and adjustment” strategy described in the psychology, economics, and marketing literatures, 
in which subjects adjust a first approximation response – the “anchor” – based on additional 
information, typically applying insufficient adjustment relative to the ideal observer.
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Inverse prior knowledge conditions are convenient for counter-
balancing experimental factors in the laboratory. In the real-world, 
however, inverse prior knowledge conditions are rarely experienced 
during a time period as short as that of a typical experiment. In 
a more common real-world scenario, a certain prior knowledge 
condition can be relevant to a decision at one time, indicating that 
a bias is then appropriate, but cease to be relevant to a decision at a 
later date. People often fail to adopt the appropriate bias of zero in 
the later decision, presumably because they have difficulty ignor-
ing the previously learned but no longer relevant prior knowledge. 
This phenomenon is familiar to us all. In fact, although decision 
researchers use the word bias to refer to an optimizable quantity, 
the common English usage connotes an undesirable influence that 
ideally should be set aside. Thus, the typical laboratory approach 
of inverting prior knowledge conditions within subjects does not 
adequately reflect real-world constraints.
To address this problem experimentally, we probed the behav-
ioral and fMRI responses of human subjects viewing ambiguous 
abstract shapes and deciding whether a shape was of Category A 
(smoother) or B (bumpier). The decision was made in the context 
of one of two prior knowledge cues, 80/20 and 50/50. The 80/20 cue 
meant that upcoming shapes had an 80% probability of being of 
INTRODUCTION
When making decisions, people take advantage of available prior 
knowledge to bias their choices (Green and Swets, 1966). This 
common-sense behavior increases the chance that decisions will 
be correct. In the laboratory, researchers study the effects of prior 
knowledge on decision bias by asking subjects to make choices 
in the context of two or more prior knowledge conditions. For 
example, consider a prior knowledge condition indicating that 
Alternative 1 has an 80% and Alternative 2 has a 20% chance of 
being the correct choice; we will call this an 80/20 prior knowledge 
condition. In many experiments (Green and Swets, 1966; Healy and 
Kubovy, 1978, 1981; Maddox, 2002), subjects trained and tested on 
an 80/20 prior knowledge condition are also trained and tested on 
the inverse condition: 20/80, in which Alternative 1 has an 20% 
and Alternative 2 has an 80% chance of being the correct choice. 
In some cases the 50/50 condition, in which each alternative has 
a 50% chance of being the correct choice, is also tested. Under 
such experimental conditions, the performance of human subjects 
approximates that of the ideal observer, who would bias decisions 
in favor of the indicated alternatives at 80/20 and 20/80 and exhibit 
zero bias at 50/50 (Green and Swets, 1966; Healy and Kubovy, 1978, 
1981; Maddox, 2002).
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distorted circle stimuli were created in MATLAB (Version 7.31) 
according to and adapted from equations from Wilkinson et al. 
(1998). The shape contour of each stimulus, r(q), was created by 
sinusoidally modulating the radius of a circle:
r r A ( ) ( sin( )) θ ωθ φ = + + mean 1   (1)
where r and q (in radians) are the polar coordinates of the contour, 
rmean is its mean radius and A, w, f are, respectively, the amplitude 
(expressed as a proportion of the radius), radial frequency, and 
phase of the modulation. Setting A to 0 defines a perfect circle. The 
cross-sectional profile of each stimulus, c, was modified by blurring 
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where r is the set of all distances between the central point and the 
image edge, r(q) is as defined in Eq. 1, and s determines the peak spa-
tial frequency of the output image (peak spatial   frequency = √2 / ps). 
one category, e.g., B, and a 20% probability of being of the other; we 
refer to the 80 and 20% categories as indicated and contraindicated 
respectively. The 50/50 cue meant that upcoming shapes had an 
equal probability of being of either category. Subjects learned the 
meaning of the cues in pre-scan training runs. During training, the 
80/20 and 50/50 cues were accompanied by 80/20 and 50/50 target 
distributions, respectively; the training distributions were created 
by manipulating the prior probability of occurrence of the physical 
targets themselves, rather than changing the category boundary. No 
subject experienced inverse prior knowledge conditions; for exam-
ple, a subject who learned that 80/20 indicated Category A never 
had to relearn the task with a 20/80 cue contraindicating Category 
A. We found that subjects’ decisions made in the context of both the 
80/20 cue and the 50/50 cue were biased in the direction indicated 
by the 80/20 cue. In the 50/50 condition, the magnitude of the bias 
was diminished relative to the 80/20 condition, but failed to reach 
the zero bias predicted for the ideal observer. The persistent bias 
suggested that even when the chance of either target type was equal, 
the targets were processed at some level by the prior knowledge 
subjects as indicated or contraindicated. Therefore, we predicted 
that, in some brain areas, differences in fMRI activation elicited 
by indicated vs. contraindicated targets in the 80/20 runs would 
be persistent, though perhaps diminished, in the 50/50 runs. This 
hypothesis found confirmation in fMRI data from frontal and pari-
etal regions previously implicated in decision-making. As a control, 
we acquired fMRI data from naïve subjects who experienced only 
the 50/50 stimulus distributions during both the pre-scan training 
and the fMRI experiment. The behavioral and fMRI data from these 
naïve subjects reflected decision biases closer to those of the ideal 
observer than those of the prior knowledge subjects at 50/50. These 
findings have important implications for understanding decision-
making under ambiguity in real-world conditions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
In this study, we acquired fMRI and behavioral data from 58 sub-
jects, all of whom provided informed consent before the experi-
ment. All procedures were approved by the National Institute of 
Mental Health Institutional Review Board. All subjects were right-
handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Here we 
present the data from 45 subjects (22 male) of mean age 25 years 
(range 20–41). Data from the remaining subjects were excluded 
because of a report that uncomfortably dry eyes prevented the 
subject from focusing on the stimuli, a broken shim coil, unac-
ceptably low estimates of d′ or patterns of random button presses 
that led to poor fits to psychometric functions.
STIMULI AND TASk
Targets were distorted circles (Wilkinson et al., 1998) whose sinu-
soidal modulation ranged linearly from 4 to 22% of the mean 
radius, with step size 0.5%. The smoothest target was defined as 
the Category A prototype, and the bumpiest as the Category B 
prototype (Figure 1). Distributions of Category A and B shapes 
were Gaussian and overlapping (Healy and Kubovy, 1981; Maddox, 
2002). The overlapping distributions made intermediate targets 
ambiguous, so that the targets alone would not contain sufficient 
information for subjects to classify them with perfect accuracy. The 
Figure 1 | Target distributions and visual appearance. (A) The distributions 
of Category A and B shapes shown during all fMRI runs were Gaussian and 
overlapping. Curvature levels between 9 and 17% of the radius were 
ambiguous, i.e., shapes of these curvature levels could be of either category. 
(B) The visual appearance of all curvature levels used. Neighboring shapes 
were difficult or impossible to discriminate from one another, preventing 
subjects from using a visual memorization strategy to perform the task. (C) In 
the experiment, the shapes were jittered in size, position, and orientation, as 
in the examples shown here.
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knowledge conditions could be attributed only to the cue and not 
to stimulation differences. Second, subjects did not receive feedback 
during scanning. Third, one-third of the trials in each scanning 
run were catch trials, in which a blank screen took the place of 
the target and subjects were instructed to make no response. The 
inclusion of catch trials permitted us to obtain estimates of activity 
during decisions vs. catch trials within each priors cue condition.
The  remaining  23  subjects  underwent  pre-scan  behavioral 
training at the 50/50 distribution only and experienced the sham 
cue (OO/OO) during both the training and the fMRI experiment. 
These naïve subjects were never exposed to the 80/20 distribu-
tions experienced during training by the prior knowledge subjects, 
and were not informed explicitly that the underlying distributions 
were always 50/50. In other respects, the instructions, training, and 
fMRI experiment were identical for the naïve subjects and the prior 
knowledge subjects.
The order of trial types (Category A target, Category B target 
or catch trial) for the scanning runs was determined by assigning 
each run a different ternary m-sequence. M-sequences are effi-
cient in terms of signal per time, especially for relatively short scan 
durations, and are exactly counterbalanced over time, minimizing 
any uncontrolled adaptation or expectation effects (Sutter, 2001; 
Burac ˇas and Boynton, 2002). M-sequences were generated using 
code written by G. Burac ˇas (Burac ˇas and Boynton, 2002). Each run-
length m-sequence was length 34 − 1 = 80, consisting of 27 Category 
A stimulus trials, 27 Category B stimulus trials, and 26 catch trials; 
thus 33% of the trials were catch trials. Each trial lasted 2.5 s. A 
blank grayscale screen was shown for 10 s at the beginning of each 
run to allow the magnetic field to reach equilibrium and for 12.5 s 
at the end of each run to allow for the delay in the hemodynamic 
response. The cue was 50/50 on six runs and 80/20 on six runs, 
with the cue type alternating pseudorandomly from run to run.
IMAgINg DATA ACqUISITION AND PREPROCESSINg
All MRI data were collected on a GE 3-Tesla scanner with a GE 
whole-head 8-channel coil. For fMRI we used an echo-planar imag-
ing (EPI) sequence with repetition time (TR) = 2.5 s per shot (=2.5 s 
per acquired brain volume), echo time (TE) = 30 ms, field of view 
22 cm by 22 cm, resolution 64 × 64 voxels per slice (in-plane voxel 
size 3.4 mm × 3.4 mm), and slice thickness 3.0 mm. Each fMRI 
The color of the distorted circles was converted to black and the 
background was converted to gray. Stimuli were presented with the 
Presentation software (Version 10.22) and projected onto a translu-
cent screen placed at the foot of the scanner bed. Subjects viewed a 
reflection of the back-projected stimuli.
The task (Figure 2) was to decide whether a shape was Category 
A or B. The shapes were presented one at a time with random 
sizes, orientations, and locations to encourage the use of stimulus 
shape to make decisions and to prevent subjects from relying on 
retinotopic location or spatial attention in order to perform well. 
No part of any shape subtended more than two radial degrees, and 
the location of the fixation cross was inside each shape. Before each 
shape a cue was presented; the same cue was used throughout each 
run. To ensure that the subject did not forget the prior knowledge 
condition during the run, the cue was repeated at the beginning 
of each trial.
Before entering the scanner, 22 subjects underwent behavioral 
training that included explicit prior knowledge cues, 80/20 and 
50/50. The indicated target category – that is, the category indicated 
by 80 in the 80/20 training runs – was A for 8 subjects and B for 
14 subjects. In the training, two 80/20 and two 50/50 runs were 
interleaved. For each subject, the order was 50/50 run 1, 80/20 
run 1, 50/50 run 2, 80/20 run 2. The 80/20 training runs were 
comprised of 80% indicated (i.e., having curvature smoother than 
the mean sinusoidal modulation of 13% if the indicated category 
was A, or bumpier than 13% if the indicated category was B) and 
20% contraindicated targets. The 50/50 runs were comprised of 
50% of each target type. Thus, during training, the explicit prior 
knowledge cues reflected the implicit prior probability distribu-
tions of the targets. Subjects received feedback after each training 
trial. These 22 subjects were informed explicitly that the target 
distributions were 80/20 and 50/50, and their understanding of 
this concept was confirmed by their answers to questions during 
pre-training instruction. For these subjects, the scanning runs dif-
fered from training runs in three respects. First, all scanning runs 
were comprised of 50% indicated and 50% contraindicated targets, 
such that the targets in each 80/20 run were identical to the targets 
in a 50/50 run. This control ensured that differences between prior 
Figure 2 | Trial structure during training and scanning. For decision trials, subjects were instructed to decide whether each target was of Category A or B. For 
catch trials, subjects were instructed to continue fixating and await the next trial. A small fixation dot was present during the stimulus epoch of each trial and during 
the delay and response epochs of both decision and catch trials.
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by 3dvolreg. The GLM analysis was performed using 3dDeconvolve. 
Outputs were voxelwise beta weights representing the percent signal 
change vs. baseline attributable to each regressor. Signal variability 
attributable to head motion estimates was assigned to the baseline.
For each subject, the ROIs derived from the contraindicated 
vs. indicated analysis on the 80/20 data were converted to indi-
vidual brain space. The betas corresponding to each subject’s 
fMRI responses to each of the nine curvature bins at 80/20 and 
50/50, respectively, were sampled from and averaged within each 
individual ROI. The grand means and SE across subjects were 
calculated for each bin and prior knowledge condition, and the 




The behavioral data acquired during fMRI data acquisition indi-
cate that training with the prior knowledge cues induced a deci-
sion bias during the fMRI experiment. In this paper we refer to 
subjects trained that the 80/20 cue indicated smoother targets as 
Group A prior knowledge subjects and to subjects trained that the 
80/20 cue indicated bumpier targets as Group B prior knowledge 
subjects. During the fMRI experiment, Group A (or B) prior knowl-
edge subjects responded “A” (or “B”) for a given shape during the 
80/20 runs more often than did the naïve subjects making deci-
sions about the same shapes (Figure 3; orange for Group A prior 
knowledge, red for Group B prior knowledge, black for naïve). 
The decision bias observed in the prior knowledge subjects during 
80/20 runs was retained (although diminished in magnitude) when 
the cue was 50/50. That is, during the fMRI experiment, Group 
A (or B) prior knowledge subjects responded “A” (or “B”) for a 
given shape during the 50/50 runs more often than did the naïve 
subjects making decisions about the same shapes (Figure 3; light 
blue for Group A prior knowledge, dark blue for Group B prior 
knowledge, black for naïve). The magnitude of the persistent bias 
at 50/50 was diminished relative to the magnitude of the bias at 
80/20. In Figure 3, the diminishment is shown as a shift to the left 
or right between the 80/20 curves and 50/50 curves within each 
prior knowledge subject group (orange to light blue for Group A, 
red to dark blue for Group B). If the bias had diminished to zero 
in the 50/50 runs for the prior knowledge subjects, this would 
have appeared as overlapping report curves in the naïve subjects 
and in the 50/50 runs from all prior knowledge subjects, but such 
was not the case.
Criterion values for all subject groups and prior conditions, 
as well as criterion values expected from the ideal observer, are 
presented in Table 1. Subjects in the 80/20 condition set their 
criterion values closer to the optimal value for 50/50 than would 
the ideal observer, as is seen in the Figure 3 curves. Table 1 also 
demonstrates that the converse was true: Subjects in the 50/50 
condition set their criterion values closer to the optimal value for 
80/20 than would the ideal observer. Thus, it appears that previous 
experience not only prevented subjects from setting aside previ-
ously learned non-zero biases when a zero bias would have been 
appropriate, but also prevented subjects from attaining adequate 
non-zero bias when a condition with a smaller optimal bias had 
been previously learned.
brain volume consisted of 38 axial slices. For anatomical images 
we used an magnetization prepared rapid acquisition gradient 
echo (MP-RAGE) sequence with field of view 24 cm by 24 cm, 
128 locations per slab and slice thickness 1.2 mm. Unless otherwise 
noted, preprocessing and subsequent analysis of the MRI data was 
performed with the AFNI software package (Cox, 1996; Cox and 
Hyde, 1997). Italics indicate AFNI function names. The first four 
brain volumes of every fMRI run were removed and brain volumes 
were time-shifted to account for the acquisition time of each slice. 
Data from each run were registered and motion-corrected using 
3dvolreg. Each subject’s T1-weighted anatomical dataset was warped 
via 12-parameter affine transform to a single template volume (the 
N27 “Colin” brain) in Talairach space using @auto_tlrc.
ROI IDENTIfICATION
To identify regions of interest (ROIs), we first estimated fMRI 
responses in the 80/20 runs to the presentation of targets indi-
cated and contraindicated by the 80/20 cue. Two sequences of 0s 
and 1s, where the 1s represented indicated and contraindicated 
targets respectively, were convolved with a model hemodynamic 
function using waver to create the regressors for the analysis. 
Other inputs to the GLM were the estimates of head motion 
produced by 3dvolreg. The GLM analysis was performed using 
3dDeconvolve. Outputs were voxelwise beta weights represent-
ing the percent signal change vs. baseline attributable to each 
regressor. Signal variability attributable to head motion estimates 
was assigned to the baseline. A random effects analysis (random 
effect of subject) was performed on the betas produced by the 
individual GLMs. using 3dAnova2 to calculate the mean responses 
to indicated and contraindicated targets and to obtain indicated 
vs. contraindicated differences.
From the group analysis results, a mask was derived identify-
ing voxels where indicated vs. contraindicated differences, as well 
as either the indicated or contraindicated mean activity levels, 
exceeded uncorrected p < 0.01. Taking account of the mean activ-
ity levels ensured that the results would reflect differences between 
activations, not differences between deactivations. The smooth-
ness of each group analysis result was calculated using 3dFWHMx 
with an input of s = m/t, where m is the coefficient or mean value 
and t is the t-statistic. A cutoff for significant cluster size (cor-
rected p-value 0.05) was determined using AlphaSim with inputs 
of derived smoothness, connectivity 5.9 mm (the distance between 
voxel vertices), and a p-value of 0.01 (the uncorrected p-value). 
Clusters exceeding cutoff were identified using 3dmerge. Talairach 
coordinates for the ROIs were determined by affine registration to 
the TT-N27 brain template, and Brodmann area equivalents were 
derived from the Talairach–Tournoux atlas (TT-Daemon).
TUNINg CURvES
To derive tuning curves from the within-ROI data, we sorted the trials 
by curvature level into nine bins ranging from smoothest to bumpi-
est. We performed a separate GLM analysis for each subject and prior 
knowledge condition, estimating fMRI responses to the presentation 
of targets within each bin. Nine sequences of 0s and 1s, where the 1s 
represented targets in a given bin, were convolved with a model hemo-
dynamic function using waver to create the regressors for the analysis. 
Other inputs to the GLM were the estimates of head motion produced www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 29  |  5
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Group A prior knowledge subjects, the p-values by paired t-test for 
differences between indicated vs. contraindicated RTs were less than 
0.00001 at 80/20 and less than 0.05 at 50/50. For the Group B prior 
knowledge subjects, the p-values by paired t-test for differences 
between indicated vs. contraindicated RTs were less than 0.00001 
at 80/20 and less than 0.01 at 50/50.
fMRI ACTIvITy
The persistent though diminished behavioral bias at 50/50 sug-
gested that even when the chance of either target type was equal, 
the targets were processed at some level by the prior knowledge 
subjects as indicated or contraindicated. Therefore, we predicted 
that, in some brain areas, differences in fMRI activation elicited 
by indicated vs. contraindicated targets in the 80/20 runs would 
be persistent, though perhaps diminished, in the 50/50 runs. This 
general prediction led to three hypotheses. The first hypothesis was 
that in brain regions with a different pattern of fMRI activation to 
indicated vs. contraindicated targets in the prior knowledge sub-
jects at 80/20, a similar though perhaps diminished pattern would 
be observed in the prior knowledge subjects at 50/50. The second 
hypothesis was that the observed indicated vs. contraindicated pat-
tern would be consistent across both the Group A and the Group B 
prior knowledge subjects. This hypothesis predicts a reversed pat-
tern of fMRI activation to smoother vs. bumpier targets in Group 
B relative to Group A, because the indicated/contraindicated targets 
were smoother/bumpier for Group A and bumpier/smoother for 
Group B. The third hypothesis was that the fMRI activations in the 
naïve subjects, plotted in terms of smoother vs. bumpier targets, 
would be intermediate to those of the Group A vs. Group B prior 
knowledge subjects in the 50/50 runs.
To test these predictions, we first identified ROIs where a sub-
traction between the activation to the set of all indicated targets 
at 80/20 vs. the activation to the set of all contraindicated targets 
at 80/20 produced significant results. After correction for multiple 
comparisons, the surviving clusters were right middle frontal gyrus 
(MFG), bilateral inferior frontal junction (IFJ), bilateral medial 
frontal gyrus (MedFG), bilateral anterior insula (AI), and bilat-
eral inferior parietal lobule and intraparietal sulcus (IPL/IPS), as 
illustrated in Figure 5. For coordinates, Brodmann area equivalents 
and ROI volumes, see Table 3.
We performed t-tests to test for significance of the differences 
between mean criterion values across subject groups and prior 
knowledge conditions (Table 2). In most cases, the differences 
were highly significant (p < 0.0001). The differences did not attain 
significance in only one case, naïve vs. Group B 50/50 (p > 0.14).
The persistent bias at 80/20 was evident not only in the response 
categories but also in the response times (RTs). RTs in the prior 
knowledge subjects were faster, even at 50/50, for indicated than 
contraindicated targets (Figure 4, diamonds vs. squares). For the 
Figure 3 | Priors training biases decision reports at 50/50 relative to 
naïve subjects. Orange and light blue: reports from Group A subjects, who 
were trained on both 80/20 and 50/50 stimulus distributions and who learned 
that 80/20 meant 80% probability of A and 20% probability of B. Black: reports 
from naïve subjects, who were trained on the 50/50 stimulus distributions 
only and who were not explicitly informed of the probability ratio. Red and 
dark blue: reports from Group B subjects, who were trained on both 80/20 and 
50/50 stimulus distributions and who learned that 80/20 meant 80% 
probability of B and 20% probability of A. The dotted horizontal line indicates 
chance performance. The shift in the curves from orange to red indicates that 
given the same target, Group A subjects responded “ A” more often than 
Group B subjects when the cue was 80/20. The shift in the curves from light 
to dark blue indicates that given the same target, Group A subjects also 
responded “ A” more often than Group B subjects when the cue was 50/50. 
The black curve is intermediate to the light and dark blue curves, indicating 
that the naïve subjects’ responses were intermediate to the Group A and B 
subjects’ responses at 50/50.
Table 1 | Criterion and d′ values.
Cue, subject group  Criterion, ideal  Criterion, observed  Criterion, observed  d′, ideal  d′, observed  d′, observed
  observer  mean  SD  observer  mean  SD
80/20, Group A  1.2  0.98  0.20  2.0  1.31  0.31
50/50, Group A  0.0  0.33  0.18  2.0  1.44  0.12
80/20, Group B  −1.2  −0.86  0.35  2.0  1.47  0.24
50/50, Group B  0.0  −0.38  0.37  2.0  1.34  0.15
OO/OO, naïve  0.0  −0.16  0.26  2.0  1.16  0.24
Criterion values were calculated as λ = −1/2 [Z(f) + Z(h)] (Wickens, 2002), where Z is z-score calculated from p-values on a standard Gaussian distribution, f stands for 
false alarm rate and refers to the proportion of smoother than average targets incorrectly classified as bumpier than average, and h stands for hit rate and refers to 
the proportion of bumpier than average targets correctly classified as smoother than average. A criterion value of zero corresponds to the midpoint target; negative 
and positive values correspond to smoother and bumpier targets respectively. The criterion values reported for the ideal observer would produce response ratios 
equivalent to the ratio of expected target types, i.e., 80/20 or 50/50. Values of d′ were calculated as d′ = Z(f) + Z(h); Z, f, and h defined above. The d′ values reported 
for the ideal observer were determined by the degree of overlap between the indicated and contraindicated target distributions.Frontiers in Neuroscience  | Decision Neuroscience    March 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 29  |  6
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ROI, the 50/50 activation magnitude at that bin was significantly 
(p < 0.01 via a t-test across subjects) greater than the mean 50/50 
activation across all bins.
To further quantify these observations, we identified the peak 
ambiguous bin in each individual prior knowledge subject at 80/20 
and at 50/50. The across-subject medians of these values are plotted 
in Figure 6B. Consistent with our hypotheses, in all ROIs the 50/50 
Group A and B medians fell on the same side of the midpoint as 
the 80/20 Group A and B medians respectively.
To test our third hypothesis – namely, that the fMRI activations 
in the naïve subjects, plotted in terms of smoother vs. bumpier 
targets, would be intermediate to those of the Group A vs. Group 
B prior knowledge subjects in the 50/50 runs – we then examined 
the tuning curves from the naïve subjects (Figure 6A, bottom, and 
Figure 6B, black). Consistent with our hypothesis, in no ROI did 
We then plotted the within-ROI data from both cue condi-
tions in the prior knowledge subjects and from the naïve sub-
jects as tuning curves along the dimension of target curvature 
(Figure 6). To produce the tuning curves, the targets were first 
sorted by curvature level into nine bins. Activations were then 
calculated for each individual subject via a multiple regression 
analysis, with nine regressors each representing all of the targets in 
one bin. For the prior knowledge subjects the multiple regression 
analysis was performed twice, once for the 80/20 data and once 
for the 50/50 data. Within each individual subject, cue condition 
and ROI, the average activation elicited by each target bin was 
calculated. These results were averaged across subjects to obtain 
within-ROI grand means and SE. By plotting grand means and 
SE, we obtained within-ROI tuning curves along the dimension 
of smooth to bumpy target curvature.
The 80/20 tuning curves for each ROI are plotted in Figure 6A. 
Within the parts of the 80/20 tuning curves corresponding to 
ambiguous targets, every tuning curve peaked at a contraindi-
cated bin (bumpier for Group A subjects, smoother for Group 
B subjects). In every ROI, the 80/20 activation magnitude at 
that bin was significantly (p < 0.0001 via one-tailed t-test across 
subjects) greater than the mean 80/20 activation across all bins. 
To test our first and second hypotheses – namely, that a similar 
though perhaps diminished pattern of fMRI activation would 
be observed in the prior knowledge subjects at 50/50 relative to 
80/20, and that the pattern of fMRI activation to smoother vs. 
bumpier targets would be reversed in Group B relative to Group 
A at both 80/20 and 50/50 – we then examined the 50/50 tuning 
curves from Group A and Group B (Figure 6A, middle). The 
results were consistent with our hypotheses. Within the parts 
of the 50/50 tuning curves corresponding to ambiguous targets, 
every tuning curve peaked at a contraindicated bin (bumpier for 
Group A subjects, smoother for Group B subjects), and in every 
Table 2 | Criterion and d′ differences across conditions and subject 
groups.
Subject  Criterion,  Criterion,   d′,   d′,   d.f.
group  p-value  t-value  p-value  t-value
Group  0.000008  6.9  0.30   1.1  14  
A 80 vs 50
Group  0.002  3.5  0.10  1.7  26 
B 80 vs 50
80 Group  0.00000000001  13.6   0.19  1.4  20 
A vs 80B
50 Group  0.00006  5.0  0.15  1.5  20 
A vs 50B
80 Group  0.000000000007  11.4  0.17  1.4  27 
A vs naïve
50 Group  0.00003  5.0  0.004  3.1  27 
A vs naïve
80 Group  0.00000009  6.8  0.0006  3.8  33 
B vs naïve
50 Group  0.053  2.0  0.016  2.5  33 
B vs naïve
All p-values were determined by t-test across subjects.
Figure 4 |  Priors training slows response time at 50/50 relative to naive 
subjects. (A) Group A vs. naive subjects. Colors and x-axis are as in Figure 3. 
Diamonds: Targets indicated as likely in the 80/20 training. Circles: Targets 
presented to naive subjects. Responses to indicated targets were faster than 
responses to contraindicated targets, even when the cue was 50/50: 
p < 0.00001 at 80/20, p < 0.05 at 50/50. (B) Group B vs. naive subjects. Format 
as in (A); p < 0.00001 at 80/20, p < 0.01 at 50/50. All p-values were determined 
by paired t-test.www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 29  |  7
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an 80% chance of Category A, and for Group B subjects, who were 
trained that the 80/20 cue indicated an 80% chance of Category 
B. Thus, the behavioral data demonstrate compellingly that even 
when subjects were made explicitly aware that the condition was 
50/50 – i.e., that the appropriate bias was zero – they were not able 
to set aside the previously learned bias. (2) In a network of frontal 
and parietal brain regions, the largest activity levels were evoked 
during decisions about contraindicated targets close to the extreme 
contraindicated prototype at 80/20, and about contraindicated 
targets closer to the midpoint at 50/50. Like the behavioral data, 
this observation held for both Group A and Group B subjects. (3) 
Behavioral and fMRI results from naïve subjects, who experienced 
only the 50/50 stimulus distributions during both the training and 
the experiment, were intermediate to results from the Group A 
and Group B subjects. Our observations indicate that the effects 
of a previously learned prior knowledge condition on decision 
behavior and frontoparietal fMRI activity do not disappear when 
that prior knowledge condition no longer applies, as would be 
predicted by simple signal detection models of decision-making. 
Instead, the behavior and brain activity reflect persistency of the 
contraindicated vs. indicated classifications learned in the earlier 
prior knowledge training.
These findings may be related to the “anchoring and adjust-
ment” strategy described in the psychology, economics, and mar-
keting literatures. Anchoring and adjustment is often observed in 
subjects choosing a value, for example a price, from a continuum 
of possible values. In this strategy, subjects adjust a first approxi-
mation response – the “anchor” – based on additional informa-
tion,  typically  applying  insufficient  adjustment  relative  to  the 
ideal observer. Anchoring and adjustment has been observed in 
numerous  experimental  and  real-world  scenarios  (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1973; Payne et al., 1992), but the underlying brain 
mechanism is unknown. The anchor in such scenarios appears to 
be analogous to the 80/20 bias in our study. In both cases, when 
new information renders an earlier response irrelevant, subjects 
respond with a behavioral change in the appropriate direction but 
of less than optimal magnitude. We suggest that the underlying 
brain mechanism in anchoring and adjustment scenarios may be 
similar to that observed here. Specifically, in this study we identified 
a network of frontal and parietal regions as persistently selective 
for the previously learned classification contraindicated by prior 
knowledge. We predict that the same regions can be shown to be 
persistently selective for many other kinds of previously learned 
classifications,  including  the  classic  anchoring  and  adjustment 
example – a previously experienced price.
The frontal and parietal regions we identified are consistent with 
human fMRI and monkey neurophysiology studies of the experi-
mental factors we manipulated. The MFG and the parietal ROIs 
overlap ROIs previously identified in human subjects as respond-
ing during decision tasks using stimuli and behavioral responses 
of various modalities (Milham et al., 2003; Grinband et al., 2006; 
Huettel et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2008). These regions have also 
been shown to exhibit preferential responses to unexpected stimuli 
(McCarthy et al., 1997; Huettel et al., 2002; Derrfuss et al., 2005; 
Melcher and Gruber, 2006); in the current study, the appearance 
of contraindicated stimuli may be unexpected. The AI, MedFG, 
and IFJ have been implicated in measures of cognitive control such 
the naïve median fall outside the range between the Group A and 
B medians at 50/50. Thus, the results supported each of our three 
hypotheses, confirming that the signature of a persistent though 
diminished bias at 50/50 was evident in the fMRI data from the 
identified frontal and parietal ROIs.
We also searched for overall differences in activation across 
all targets between prior knowledge subjects at 80/20 vs. 50/50, 
between  prior  knowledge  subjects  at  80/20  vs.  naïve  subjects, 
and between prior knowledge subjects at 50/50 vs. naïve subjects. 
However, in none of these comparisons did a cluster anywhere in 
the brain survive correction for multiple comparisons. We con-
clude that the persistent bias at 50/50 did not occur because the 
80/20 training caused parts of the brain to be more or less active 
overall in the prior knowledge subjects than in the naïve subjects. 
Instead the 80/20 training induced a dynamic pattern in the frontal 
and parietal data that was retained in the 50/50 condition and not 
experienced by the naïve subjects.
DISCUSSION
This study produced three main findings. (1) After subjects were 
trained on an 80/20 prior knowledge condition, they continued to 
exhibit a decision bias in favor of the learned indicated alternative, 
even when explicitly informed that the current prior knowledge 
condition was 50/50. At 50/50, the bias diminished in magnitude 
relative to 80/20 but did not reach zero. This observation held both 
for Group A subjects, who were trained that the 80/20 cue indicated 
Figure 5 | regions of interest locations. Locations are defined from 
observations of a significant difference in fMRI signal between indicated and 
contraindicated targets in the 80/20 prior knowledge condition.
Table 3 | regions of interest locations and volumes.
rOi  X  Y  Z  Brodmann  Volume, 
        area(s)  mm3
MidFG (R)  41.7  30.8  23.3  46, 9  93
AntIns (R)  35.1  17 .3  6.3  13  117
AntIns (L)  −31.9  17 .2  7 .1  13  111
MedFG (bi)  1.1  11.8  43.4  6, 32  220
IFJ (R)  46.4  4.6  29.6  9, 6  83
IPL/IPS (L)  −40.2  −44.7  42.4  40  172
IPL/IPS (R)  36.8  −50.3  38.9  40  153Frontiers in Neuroscience  | Decision Neuroscience    March 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 29  |  8
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